
A traveler-authored hotel-review community where travelers filter reviews by reviewer demographics to choose hotels.
TravelPost's defensible advantages were inherited data and search distribution, not anything the 2010 team built: at the May 2010 takeover Simon Breakwell said the site was attractive because it had a strong Google ranking and a solid base of hotel reviews, and PhocusWire reported the brand was kept for its 'relative consumer panache and SEO value' — distribution assets a new entrant could not quickly replicate.
The filtering mechanism also held up head-to-head: in Budget Travel's June 2009 smackdown the site won the Filters round — 'Lets you filter reviews by the gender, age, and budget of their authors' against an unfilterable TripAdvisor — and the Pricing round on the strength of the Kayak-powered Rates tab, evidence the acquired data asset supported a differentiated product and not only traffic.
Source: bizjournals.com
Scale was the gap that mattered against TripAdvisor: the incumbent held about 23 million reviews in 2009 to TravelPost's roughly one tenth as many, a thinness that often left a hotel page with too few reviews to show a consensus. That deficit undercuts the core promise, because a filtering community is only as useful as the review volume behind each listing, and the rival's far larger base supplied mass opinion on every property.
Execution widened it: the service promoted in 2010 as a 'great leap forward' in online travel had still not launched by January 2011, when the company cut eight employees, roughly half its staff, and its CEO and COO stepped down — leaving the sub-scale review base as the main asset against an incumbent that was simultaneously larger and already shipping.
The category consolidated around one dominant mass-review incumbent, and that movement eroded this position rather than strengthened it: TripAdvisor entered 2009 as the giant of user-generated hotel reviews while TravelPost's March 2009 relaunch put it into a niche that rival already dominated, at roughly one tenth the leader's review volume. Scale was the axis the category rewarded, and consolidation handed it to the incumbent before the 2010 team placed its bet.
Ownership of the site itself consolidated in step — SideStep bought it in October 2006, Kayak took over in December 2007, and Kayak sold to the NewTravelco group in 2010 — while Breakwell argued in 2010 that incumbents were too preoccupied (sic) with their own stores to innovate; the category's demand for scale outlasted the company's 2010 bet, and the January 2011 retrenchment followed before any launch.
Execution risk was the thesis-breaking risk, and its warning signs were public: after raising USD 9.8 million in 2010 and promising a 'great leap forward' in online travel, the company had still not launched by January 2011, when it cut eight employees — roughly half the company — 'to alter the scope' of the unshipped product and CEO Greg Slyngstad and COO Simon Breakwell stepped down.
Concentration compounded it: the thesis rested entirely on an acquired review base and the brand's search ranking, Kayak was at once asset seller, shareholder and cross-licensing partner (PhocusWire, May 2010), and the promoted CEO, Jason Karas, had joined only in October 2010; the mitigants on record — founder board seats and Kayak's continued involvement — did not produce a shipped product.
Source: budgettravel.com
Source: en.wikipedia.org
Source: bizjournals.com