RDA Microelectronics operated as a fabless semiconductor company designing wireless systems-on-chip and radio-frequency components for cellular, connectivity and broadcast devices.
Which advantages over its rivals hold up, and why are they hard to copy?
RDA Microelectronics countered MediaTek in Chinese handsets and broad-line rivals Broadcom, Infineon and STMicroelectronics through integration, portfolio breadth and local sales and engineering, not through a larger line-up of its own. Its strengths also covered advanced radio-frequency design, a wireless system-on-chip technology platform, a record of delivering highly integrated products, proven development ability, and an engineering team with experienced managers at its head. The rivals it measured itself against offered broad ranges of stand-alone and integrated semiconductor solutions.
RDA Microelectronics differentiated itself because a library of radio-frequency, mixed-signal and digital signal processing building blocks assembled through internal development and licensing fed system-level intellectual property, and because field application engineers gave on-site support before and after sales, often alongside the R&D engineers who had built the product, so customers could substitute its parts for a competitor's inside their existing designs.
Who does it compete with for the same buyer, and how do they differ?
RDA Microelectronics competed on two fronts at once: head-on with MediaTek across a range of mobile handset products in China, and against broad-line multinationals such as Broadcom, Infineon and STMicroelectronics, whose portfolios covered stand-alone and integrated semiconductor solutions across its ranges.
Within individual product families, RDA Microelectronics confronted RF Micro Devices and Skyworks in power amplifiers, NXP and Silicon Laboratories in FM radio receivers, Maxim and Zarlink in DVB-S tuners, Maxim, MaxLinear and NXP in DVB-T tuners, Telegent in analog mobile television receivers, and CSR in Bluetooth solutions.
The competitive factors RDA Microelectronics identified were level of integration, price, short design cycle, customer support, features and functionalities, die size and form factor, and performance including reliability and power consumption. Rivals with multiple product lines could bundle or integrate parts and price them more aggressively; one cut prices on its integrated baseband and Bluetooth product in the second half of 2009, and some designed their products so third-party parts were harder to use.
Which risks could break the thesis, and what would warn of them?
The exposure that could break RDA was supply and price, not demand: it bought CMOS from foundries it did not control—TSMC in Taiwan, SMIC in China, GlobalFoundries in Singapore, IBM in the US—and gallium arsenide from WIN Semiconductors in Taiwan and TriQuint in the US, while it had cut average selling prices under competitive pressure and expected to keep cutting them. Its Bluetooth system-on-chip price fell after a rival cut prices on an integrated baseband and Bluetooth product in the second half of 2009, hurting gross margin for 2009 and the first half of 2010.
In the first six months of 2009, other fabless companies' competition for foundry slots kept RDA from obtaining the manufacturing capacity it needed, delaying shipments and leading some customers to cancel orders.
What does the product do for its buyer, and how is it delivered?
RDA Microelectronics served device makers needing amplification and tuning in their products. The company designed, developed and marketed radio-frequency and mixed-signal semiconductors aimed at cellular, broadcast and connectivity applications. Its portfolio spanned power amplifiers, transceivers and front-end modules, FM radio receivers, set-top box tuners, analog mobile television receivers, walkie-talkie transceivers, LNB satellite downconverters and Bluetooth system-on-chip, beginning after the first product shipped in 2005.
Chips were made by third-party foundries, with packaging and testing handled by independent vendors, an outsourced model that left RDA Microelectronics focused on design, sales and marketing. Its buyers were mainly mobile handset design houses and manufacturers, set-top box design houses and manufacturers and other consumer electronics makers among more than 500 customers, almost all located in China.